Learning to Love Japan: Social Norms
and Market Incentives

J. MARK RAMSEYER*

As academics many of us love Japan. But many of us love it for
the wrong reason. We love it because it lets us imagine a world
where our analytic principles seldom apply, and our academic imaginations can run wild. Once we cite Japan all our counterfactual
whimsies become fair game: corporate control markets become inefficient, unions promote product quality, competitive stock markets
lead to inefficiently short-term horizons, efficient firms offer workers
life-time employment, and regulation systematically improves market efficiency. Once we cite Japan all our social scientific principles,
and all the constraints on our collective flights of fancy that they
impose, disappear - dismissed as the culturally contingent detritus
of an intellectually imperialist American discourse.
Within law schools, we tend to use Japan to make a narrower
point - to argue that economic incentives need not matter.
Whatever incentives markets and laws may provide, perhaps people
simply ignore them. The domestic political consequences to this vision of Japan are clear, as the debate between Richard Epstein and
his critics implicitly suggests:1 if independent social norms can sustain systematically unprofitable behavior in Japan, then maybe they
would have sustained Jim Crow policies in the American south. If
Japanese routinely ignore economic incentives to perpetuate social
norms, then maybe whites would have ignored the market advantage
to hiring African Americans and discriminated against their own
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1. This debate took place at a symposium sponsored by the University of San Diego and the Liberty Fund on Richard Epstein's book, Forbidden Grounds: The Case
Against Employment Discrimination Laws.

best interests. If our picture of Japan is true, then maybe merely
dismantling the legal edifice of Jim Crow will not do.
I had thought the potential problems with this analysis apparent,
but (given the responses to Epstein) apparently I thought wrong. For
the sake of illustration, consider whether (or when) Japanese disputants will ignore advantageous legal rules in order to settle by reference to disadvantageous social norms.2 Posit a Japanese courtenforceable rule about issue X that differs significantly from Japanese communal norms about X. Suppose further that courts are not
prohibitively expensive, and ignore for the moment any social sanctions against invoking the court-enforceable rule. In most disputes
over X, one of the parties (P) will have an incentive to sue. By suing,
P will be able to invoke the legal rule which - differing significantly
from the communal norm - necessarily works to P's benefit. Because P can credibly threaten to sue, even parties that settle will
settle by reference to the legal rule.
Consider now an additional norm, one that stigmatizes those who
sue as antisocial. If a Japanese who invokes a legal rule (i.e., one
who sues) incurs substantial communal sanctions, then many members of the community may no longer find it advantageous to invoke
the rule. Yet in any community, the susceptibility of its members to
social sanctions varies. For some members social respectability matters tremendously; for others it matters very little. Given this differing vulnerability to social sanctions, however, those for whom the
sanctions are least costly may well decide to flout the sanctions and
invoke the court-enforced rules.
The fragility of social norms becomes clearest here, for norms are
subjectively compelling only when widely observed. The more often
some Japanese (those least vulnerable to social sanctions) invoke
court-enforced rules, the harder others (those more vulnerable to
such sanctions) will find it to tell themselves (a) that the social norm
about X (not the legal rule) is the right way to resolve X, and (b)
that people who invoke legal rules are antisocial. The more often
some members of a community violate a given norm, the harder
other members will find it to define those norms as true and the violators as immoral. As a result, absent institutional incentives that
make immoral behavior unprofitable, those social norms defining the
behavior as immoral will often tend to unravel.
The qualifications to all this are important, but straightforward.
The smaller the gains to ignoring social norms," the smaller the
threat that economic incentives will pose to communal norms. The
2. Lest anyone miss the parallel to the Symposium, it is: consider whether (or
when) southern white employers would have ignored the economic gains to hiring African American workers in order to conform to southern white discriminatory norms.
3. In this Japanese example: the greater the costs to litigation and the smaller the
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more closed the society, the more costly the communal sanctions will
be, and -

again -

the smaller the threat economic incentives will

pose. But given those caveats, the basic point is simple: the more
self-interested strategies give members of a community an incentive
to deviate from communal norms, the more precarious those norms
will be.
Epstein used this logic to suggest that market competition would
likely have eliminated most Jim Crow practices even when white social norms mandated those practices.' He could have (given the reaction of his critics,5 he obviously should have) done better than to
cite an obscure article on Japanese traffic accidents for this point.'
After all, the authors of the traffic accident study hardly invented
the theory from thin air. On the fragility of social norms, for example, Epstein could easily have quoted several prominent anthropologists and sociologists. Take Clifford Geertz:
The source of [religious or normative] vitality is conceived to lie in the fidelity with which it expresses the fundamental nature of reality ...
[P]robably the overwhelming majority of mankind are continually drawing
normative conclusions from factual premises . . . despite refined, and in
their own terms impeccable, reflections by professional philosophers on the
"naturalistic fallacy."-

Because how we collectively act determines what we individually believe, social norms remain stable only when most members of a society have little incentive to violate them. At stake is a basic
ideological dialectic: as Geertz put it, "How, given what we believe,
must we act; what, given how we act, must we believe.""
difference between the court-ordered judgments about X and the socially mandated resolution of X. In the southern white society at issue in this Symposium: the smaller the
economic gains to transacting with African Americans.
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In fact, the dialectical logic antedates Geertz. Sociologist of religion Peter Berger, for instance, outlined one version of it nearly
three decades ago. As Berger explained it, we create a normative
world collectively, and internalize it individually. Crucially, however,
we internalize it only if it has a "taken-for-granted quality."9
The more often some members of a society violate a norm, Berger
argues, the less likely others will take it for granted. "[T]he deviant's
conduct challenges the societal reality as such," he explains, and
"put[s] in question its taken-for-granted cognitive . . . and normative" quality.' 0 Because of this contingent character, all normative
worlds "are inherently precarious. Supported by human activity,
they are constantly threatened by the human facts of self-interest
and stupidity."" They often survive, therefore, only if the society
uses institutional incentives (other than group opprobrium) to prevent the greedy and foolish from flouting them.
Restated in social anthropologist Mary Douglas' terms, social
norms are a "public good" subject to the usual corrosive logic of the
prisoner's dilemma.' 2 Members of a community collectively gain if
they all adhere to the norms; members individually gain if they violate them; and the norms themselves (by the logic above) unravel if
members individually follow that noncooperative strategy. Unless the
members can monitor each other and force each other to comply
with the norms, the most marginal members of the community will
deviate and the norms themselves may lose much of their
plausibility.
In effect, Epstein's critics miss the second half of Geertz's ideological dialectic. As they rightly note, and as Robert Ellickson elegantly
demonstrated, 3 norms do influence behavior. But they influence behavior only imperfectly, for most people have their price. When market incentives generate a high enough return to antisocial behavior,
many people will find their price met. They will flout the norms and,
as they do, the basic plausibility of the norms themselves will begin
to collapse. None of this analysis is peculiar to Japan, for none of it
is peculiar to any society. Instead, it is basic sociology of knowledge.
If it applies anywhere, it applies everywhere. It clearly applies to
Japan. By all odds, it should apply to the Old South as well.' 4
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The beauty and the frustration of social scientific analysis is that
it generates predictable results - even when, for political reasons,
we would prefer that it generate something else. We love Japan because it seems to let us imagine a society where we can ignore those
determinate results. We love it because it seems to let us indulge our
fancy for worlds where symbols and discourses (not well-ordered responses to institutional incentives) reign. It is time we learned instead to love Japan for telling us the cold truth: that,
notwithstanding the rich variation within and among societies, economic incentives generate similar and largely predictable results everywhere - in Tokyo, in Chicago, and in Jackson, Mississippi.

Furthermore, contrary to McAdam's suggestion, I have explicitly argued that, in evaluating the importance of social norms, the distinction between one-shot and repeated games
is often overdrawn. Id. at 259-61. See J. Mark Ramseyer, Legal Rules in Repeated
Deals: Banking in the Shadow of Defection in Japan, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 91 (1991).
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